609 In July the Druzes rose in revolt under Sultan al-Atrash. In August they defeated a large French force which had been sent against them. In September they were joined by a number of Damascene nationalists of whom Dr. Shahbandar was the most conspicuous, and who proclaimed a general Syrian rebellion and the formation of a national Government. The rising now spread beyond Jebel Druze to several parts of Syria. The insurgents secured a foothold in Damascus; and in October General Sarrail ordered the bombardment of the city. Parts of it were laid in ruins, and many people were killed. This incident led to the recall of Sarrail, but did not quell the revolt, which spread in November to the Druze portions of Lebanon. Only the French defence of Rashaya prevented the insurgents from dominating a large part of southern Lebanon and even threatening Beirut.

By the end of 1925 the conflict had reached its greatest extension. It covered Jebel Druze, the district of Damascus, part of the district of Homs and part of southern Lebanon; apart from the activities of guerilla bands, it never spread to northern Syria. But in the early months of 1926 the power of the insurgents began to wane. The French forces, which had been considerably strengthened, re-occupied most of the discontented parts of Lebanon, while in the interior the war tended to become a guerilla conflict between the insurgents and the Circassian and Armenian auxiliary forces raised by the French authorities. After an attempt to come to terms with the leaders of the rising had failed, a French army attacked the centre of the revolt in Jebel Druze and captured Suwaida, the capital, in April. In May an attempt was made to clear Damascus of the rebels; for the second time the city was bombarded and great damage was done. By July the pacification of the region of Damascus was complete; and from August onwards the last strongholds of insurrection in Jebel Druze and the districts of Lebanon at the foot of Mount Hermon were gradually reduced. By the end of 1926 the revolt was virtually over, except for scattered bands in remote parts. Even these were finally dispersed in 1927. The more intransigent of the insurgents went into exile, the largest group of these being Druzes who crossed with Sultan al-Atrash into Transjordan. But most of them made their submission; and in February, 1928, a general amnesty was proclaimed, excluding however a number of leaders.

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619 TRIBE AND NATION--presence or absence of groups larger than the community to which people think they "belong" in an extended kinship sense; basis of identification (e.g., common name, common language, contiguous territory, common culture, tradition of common descent); intratribal intercourse and communication (e.g., trade, intermarriage); degree of development of nationalistic aspirations; etc. See also:

Tribal or national political organization . . . 64
Affiliation with a culture area or subarea . . . 101
Ethnocentrism 186
Intercommunity relationships 628
Intertribal or international relationships 648
Nationalistic movements 668
Ideas about race 829

full time winter and summer. This is one of the reasons why most projects on the Khabur have been failures. The overhead costs are very heavy in relation to the land available.

The Government has an irrigation project partly in operation which will irrigate when completed an area of about 100,000 dunums (25,000 acres). Other projects are under study but their execution will be postponed indefinitely since the Government lacks the necessary capital.

To summarize, it would appear that not only all cultivable lands in Jazirah are already cultivated, but that farmers, in search of lands, have started using marginal lands with insufficient rainfall, and unless the price of cereals keeps at the level of last year there will follow in the coming two years a gradual decrease in the area planted, with heavy losses to individual farmers.

POPULATION OF JAZIRAH

During Turkish rule and up to the French occupation, Jazirah was a wasteland controlled by Bedouin tribes whose submission to the Turkish law was nominal.

I. The Arab Tribes

The tribes, dominated by Shammar, ruled the land and spoiled it, frustrating all attempts at agriculture. They lived on sheep and camel breeding and charged tribute from merchants for protection, each tribe within its boundaries. Moslem and Christian families from Mardin and Nisibin owned lands around what is now Kamishli, Amuda and Dirbassiya, and they traded with the tribes, buying their wool, samneh, and hides and supplying them with their needs and credit. The ownership of land for agriculture seems to have been incidental to the commercial activities of these families.

The tribal boundaries established during the Ottoman rule are still effective. Shammar claims the right of grazing from the Iraqi border at Tal Koshak to Tal Alu and south to Fadghami on the Khabur. There is another small concentration of a Shammar branch around Derbassiya known as Shammar Ezzor.

The neighbor of Shammar to the west is the Tay tribe. Its lands extend from Kubur el Bid and Kamishli south to Tal Brak. The tribe took to agriculture relatively early and in its area are some of the best lands of Jazirah.

619 To the south of Tay is the Jubur tribe. This tribe is composed
241 of two branches, the Jubur of Jagjag concentrated around Tal Brak
233 and south to Hassakeh, and the Jubur of the Khabur from north of Hassakeh to Fadghami. The Jagjag Jubur have taken to growing cereals besides grazing, but the Khabur Jubur find little employment in agriculture because their area is arid and those who do not work on irrigated lands are mostly sheep grazers.

619 Another big tribe migrating between the Euphrates and Jazirah
241 is the Baggaret el Jabal. This tribe is completely nomad. It spends
233 the winter in the plans toward Deir Ezzor and migrates in the sum-
721 mer to Jabal Abdel Aziz. It used to cross the Khabur to graze in Jazirah but a dispute arose with Shammar Ezzor in 1949 over the ownership of some villages below Derbassiya, and supported by the Kurds, Shammar was able to drive Baggara back across the Khabur.

221 Of these tribes mentioned, Shammar is still mostly nomadic
621 though its lands in the north are good for agriculture. The Tay tribe is completely sedentary, Jubur Jagjag have become mostly sedentary, while Jubur Khabur are in a measure nomads because of the unsuitability of their lands, and the Baggara are completely nomads.

619 In tribal politics, Shammar stands alone. Tay and the Jubur
721 are traditional allies against Shammar. The Baggara are enemies of Shammar and friendly to Jubur. Raids of Shammar on Jubur are frequent especially in the region of Fadghami. The last big conflict between Shammar and Tay occurred in 1951 when over a hundred persons from the two parties were killed in a fight over the ownership of the lands south of the Rad.

6221 The Bedouin Sheiks of the different Arab tribes formerly re-
6621 ceived money grants from the Ottoman Government under the guise of expenses for the maintenance of law and order in their regions. These grants were in essence bribes to keep the Sheiks quiet. Unfortunately, the French continued this system, and relied on the Sheiks to control the tribesmen by giving the Sheik a fixed annual salary, each according to his importance. In this way, the Government implicitly renounced its right to deal directly with the individual Bedouin and dealt with him only through his Sheik.

This situation, which lasted until about a year ago, strengthened the Sheik enormously in the eyes of his tribesmen, and the Sheik
627 invariably exploited the situation to his personal benefit. Thus,
425 in the Bedouin districts of Jazirah, the rapid development and
427

But proofs of their increase are the hundreds of new villages tilled by Kurds and built by them in the regions of Kubur el Bid, Amuda, and Derbassiya.

The Kurds like the Arabs, follow a tribal organization. Starting from the east, the Koshar tribe, mostly nomadic but recently turning to agriculture, dominates Jazirat ibn Amr, i.e., the region of Deink and Ain Diwar. The Koshar border Shammar on the south and they are on fighting terms because Nayefz Pasha, chief of the Koshar, killed the brother of Dham, chief of Shammar. Next to the west is the Shitiya tribe around Kubur el Bid. This tribe is old in the region. Its members are Arab in their dress and, in contrast with all the other Kurdish tribes, they speak Arabic as well as Kurdish. Its lands lie west of Shammar and more within the Tay region but its relations with both are friendly.

Qamishli, which is a Tay region, includes villages of the Pinar Ali tribe. But west of Qamishli comes a solid bloc of 100% Kurdish villages extending for more than sixty kilometers and reaching to the west of Dirbassiya practically uninterrupted by any Arab village. This area is undoubtedly one of the most fertile of Jazirah. Within it, the Dakkuriya tribe is centered around Amuda, then follow the Kikiya around Dirbassiya, and the Milliya from Dirbassiya to Ras el Ain.

The Kurds are considered very good farmers. They plow and plant with mules but they rent combines for the harvest. This is because they have learned that combine harvest is more economical. The Kurd is also greatly praised for his character. He is truthful, honest, and upright in his dealings. He keeps his word and the merchants of the Jazir trust him completely. He is also clean in his home and in his dress, and though Bedouins reproach him for not being generous in his house, his standard of living is higher than the Bedouin and his villages are much cleaner.

The Kurds owe allegiance to their Agha who takes the place of the Bedouin Sheik. But this relationship is weaker than is the case of the Bedouins. The successive Governments did not give the Agha grants of money or similar authority over his tribesmen in the manner of the Sheik. The Kurds were considered from the start sedentary people subject directly to Government laws. That is why most of the Kurds own and till their lands in their own right.

Moslems alike whether Turks or Arabs, and being suspicious of the surrounding Kurdish and Bedouin tribes, relied on the French for protection and became a tool in their hands to oppose the nationalistic aims of Syria. 6621 1821

When in 1936 negotiations between France and Syria started for the conslusion of a treaty similar to the British-Iraqi treaty, French officials in Syria who were opposed to such a policy played on the fears of the Jazirah Christians and incited them to rebellion. They rose up and drove out the Syrian public employees and proclaimed Jazirah independent. They were supported by a majority of the Kurds who feared Bedouin domination in case Syria became independent, and by some Bedouin Sheiks notably the Sheiks of Tay and of Jagjag Jubur. Dham and Mizor, Chiefs of Shammar, and the Sheik of Khabur Jubur, remained loyal to the Syrian Government. The problem was solved when the negotiations in Paris failed and the French resumed their authority in 1937. All remained quiet during the war, and when Syria became independent through the intervention of the British in 1945, no one in Jazirah made any difficulty. 648 669 619

The population of Jazirah was estimated at the end of 1951 to be 162,000. This estimate can only be tentative because no census was taken and the number of unregistered persons is large. The Shammars are mostly unregistered and so are the Juburs. The same holds true of the Kurds who have migrated from Turkey. 1621 659 361

The number of members in each denomination is unknown, as is the number of town dwellers. Qamishli is estimated to have 30,000 inhabitants, Amuda and Derbassiya 8-10,000 each, and Hassakeh above 10,000. Kurds probably outnumber the Bedouins in Jazirah.

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

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621 241 penetrated more deeply into the settled land gradually changed from nomadic pasturage to sedentary agriculture. They grew wheat and other cereals wastefully and by primitive methods which had not changed for many generations; sometimes using the remnants of the Roman irrigation system, but more often relying upon the rain and the sparse streams; producing mainly for subsistence, but selling what surplus they had in the towns. After the early Islamic period there was an uninterrupted decline in the agricultural productivity of the country. Its causes were mainly political: the exactions of tax-collectors and the depredations of civil war.

619 721 221 The constant immigration of new Beduin tribes prevented the maintenance of a stable agricultural life in all except the coastal regions. The Beduin always looked upon the settled land as a source of plunder, and gave no willing allegiance to any Government, or to any law except their own customary codes. Periodically the peasants' work was set back by the incursions of the nomads, and the constant threat of raids served as a discouragement from enterprise. The margin of cultivation was in consequence always shifting and uncertain; it moved eastwards into the desert when the Government was strong enough to hold back the Beduin or induce them to settle on the land, and when the Government was weak the opposite process took place.

621 427 651 423 In consequence of the change to agriculture, the relationship between tribesman and tribal chief was replaced by, or rather transformed into, that of peasant and landowner. Syria was a feudal country. Until the seventeenth century the lords had held their lands on condition of performing military service; but later the feudal army fell into disuse, and a new feudalism grew up based upon tax-farming. The Pasha of the province was normally the chief tax-farmer; he was required to transmit an annual tribute to Constantinople, and in return was allowed to squeeze as much as he could out of his subjects. Beneath him there was a hierarchy of feudatories, farming their districts or villages on similar terms. In some districts they were Ottoman officials, but in others the right of collecting taxes was given to the local or tribal chiefs, who were virtually autonomous. This was especially so in mountainous districts like Lebanon, Jebel Druze and the Alawi district.

621 423 The feudatory's tenure was precarious, and his power

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

production. A reform in the system of land-tenure would also help. In some parts of Lebanon small free-holdings are to be found, but in Syria large estates are the rule, and 'métayage' is perhaps the most common form of tenancy. The 'musha'' system of communal ownership, under which holdings are periodically re-distributed, is also widespread. In the past twenty years the Mandatory authorities have made progress with land-survey and the settlement of title, and with the division of lands held under the 'musha'' system. But greater tasks remain. Large tracts of the country are still in the possession of a small number of landowners, who for the most part are not interested in improving either the productivity of their lands or the standard of living of the workers. The creation of a free peasantry, by the break-up of the large estates and the appropriate use of the vast state-domains, is still in the future. The facilities for agricultural credit are very inadequate; there are practically no co-operatives and very few agricultural banks, and in consequence the peasant is in the clutches of the money-lender. The tax-system is regressive and weighs heavily upon the cultivator.

A special problem is created by the Beduin, of whom there are over half a million. Their economic function is the breeding of camels in the steppes and desert regions where agriculture is impossible. They are divided into tribes of which the most important are the various Anazah tribes—the Ruwala, the Feddan, and the Sba—in the steppe and desert south and west of the Euphrates, and the Shammar in the Jazirah. Traditionally contemptuous of the settled population and of all government, in the past they have been a serious obstacle to agriculture; but during the last two generations or so the Government has made a serious attempt to control their wanderings, and t prevent their raiding each other and the settled regions, while allowing them to preserve their tribal law and organization. At the same time their economic position is being undermined by the decline in the demand for camels. This makes it the easier to induce them to settle on the land. In the Jazirah, in the Hauran and elsewhere tribes can be found which are abandoning the wandering life. They take to breeding sheep as well as camels and become semi-sedentary; then they begin to cultivate the land and in time become wholly sedentary, thus continuing

619 that process which has been going on since the beginning of
221 history. But in the steppe and desert country where pasturing
621 is possible and cultivation impossible, the Beduin still have an important part to play.

3

162 Approximately one-third of the population lives in towns.
361 There are three towns, Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo, with between 200,000 and 300,000 inhabitants each; five others —Homs, Hama, Tripoli, Latakia and Dair az-Zur—with between 20,000 and 100,000. The inhabitants are mainly occupied in commerce and industry.

433 The structure of industry is changing more rapidly than that of agriculture. A two-fold change is taking place. On the one hand, the traditional textile, metal and other industries, which used to supply the needs of a great part of Ottoman Asia and the Arabian peninsula, are being killed by the Westernization of taste and by the competition of cheap Western and Japanese goods. On the other, modern industries are slowly being created, especially in the three principal towns, Damascus, Aleppo and Beirut. Their development has been hampered by paucity of raw materials, the scarcity of capital and to a lesser extent of technical skill, competition from Europe, America and lately from Japan, the smallness of the internal and the absence of an external market. The modern industrial equipment of the country is still confined to a small number of factories for foodstuffs, textile goods and certain other products for the internal market. The silk industry of Lebanon, which was important until it was overwhelmed by foreign competition and the introduction of artificial silk, has had a partial revival during the last few years.

504 Not only the industrial but the whole economic development of the country is handicapped by inadequate communications. There is only one modern port, Beirut, which has been developed by French capital and enterprise, and through which flows the bulk of the country's external trade. Tripoli is important as the terminus of one branch of the oil pipe-line from Iraq, but it does not yet possess adequate harbour-
496 works; Latakia is small and undeveloped. The railway system, mainly built and administered by a French concessionary company, includes only a little over a thousand
489 kilometres of track. Passengers and goods are carried

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

and certain tribes among them persuaded to settle on the land. ooo

Thus in the years between the two wars the Jazirah was almost entirely resettled by immigrant groups. The greater part of the population are still Arab Moslems, but very many of these are nomads; and of the settled population, which in 1938 was estimated at 103,000, more than 20,000 are Christians, while probably a majority and certainly a large proportion of the remainder are Kurds.[1]

Among the settled population the proportion of those whose native language is not Arabic is much larger than in any other part of Syria. Split up between a large number of sects and peoples, none of whom dominates the rest, and lacking the element of stability which an old-established population would give, the Jazirah presents a complex problem, the nature of which is determined by a large number of factors: tension between Christians and Moslems, and between Arabs and Kurds; the everlasting conflict between the Beduin and the sedentary population; and interference by Turkey and Iraq from just across the frontier.

Here, as in Jebel Druze and Latakia, there has long been a conflict between the greater number of French officials, who insist that what the district primarily needs is good and special administration such as the Syrian Government could not give it, and the nationalists, who wish to make it clear from the beginning that the Jazirah is an integral part of Syria. Of the inhabitants, the Arab Moslems are for the most part nationalists, while many of the Arab and other Christians oppose them and claim autonomy. Opposition comes also from those Kurds who demand autonomy and who are being increasingly influenced by Kurdish nationalism. The Kurds have a tribal organization, the most important tribal groups being the Barazi and Milli; and most of them have no political loyalty except to the tribe. The majority are opposed to Turkey and frightened of Arab rule, although there is a continuous process of assimilation to the Arabs; and some of them have a superficial attachment to France. It is only fairly recently that a nationalist movement has arisen among them, directed by the intellectuals in Damascus and elsewhere and organized in the 'Hoybun' party. It aims at the

[1] Another estimate for 1937 was as follows: Arab Moslems 41,900; Kurds 81,450; Christians 31,050; others 4,150; Total 158,550. To this should be added 8,000 Assyrians.

11: Hourani S-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria MD1

563 619 formation of a Kurdish State which should unite the different parts of the Kurdish nation, now divided between Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. In general, however, the Kurds are still too hostile to government as such for nationalism to have made much headway among them.

The different sections of the separatists do not seem to agree upon anything except their opposition to Syrian rule; for the population of the Jazirah possesses no such cohesion as the Druzes and Alawis. They are a collection of refugees, with something of the refugee mentality.

12

162 795 In the rest of Syria—that is to say, in the six provinces of Damascus, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, the Hauran and the Euphrates—there were at the end of 1938, according to official statistics, 352,000 members of religious minorities out of a total population of about 1,941,000, excluding the nomads. Approximately 250,000 were Christians, 91,000 heterodox Moslems and 24,000 Jews. Thus almost 20 per cent of the total population belonged to religious minorities, and of those 20 per cent roughly two-thirds were Christians. Most of the Christians are Arabic-speaking, with the exception of the Armenians. There must also be taken into account the several thousand Circassians, Turcomans and Kurds who are Sunni Moslems and therefore not members of religious minorities, but who constitute racial and linguistic minorities.

The members of religious minorities are most numerous in the provinces of Damascus and Aleppo, in each of which they number over 100,000, out of a total population of 530,000 in the former and 750,000 in the latter; but it is in the provinces of Homs and Hama that they form the largest proportion of the population (about 35 per cent). In the other two provinces—those of the Hauran and the Euphrates—there are comparatively few of them.

13

184 The differences between the Arabic-speaking Christians and the Moslems may be exaggerated. They share a language, many social customs and traditions; they are in some sense a single people. But while this is true and important, it must also be remembered that they differ from one another not only in religion but also in certain of their intellectual,

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS.

14:International Bank S-5 (1954) 1955 MD1 Syria MD1

ANNEX C *NOTES ON AGRICULTURE*

1 POPULATION, REGIONS AND SOILS

Rural Population

Syria's agricultural population can be divided into groups differentiated by their social order.

Nomadic tribes. Bedouin tribespeople form an important unit of the rural population, numbering an estimated 150,000 and living in various stages of settlement from pure pastoral nomadism to almost permanent agricultural communities. Among the larger tribes the Tay and part of the Jubur have become practically sedentary, the Shammar and Shashans remaining nomadic or semi-nomadic. There are also numerous small nomadic tribes roaming the desert between the cultivated belt and the Jordan border. These harvest the scanty desert grass with their flocks of sheep and goats and their herds of camel and a few cattle, and contribute considerably to the country's livestock production. A large part of Syria's meat, wool and dairy products is produced by the Bedouins. Their standards of living and education are quite low.

The increasing exploitation of arable land for crop production during recent decades correspondingly reduced the grazing area and, may, if continued, threaten a considerable reduction in livestock.

Settled villagers. The nearly two million villagers spread over 5,500 compact villages form the most important segment of the agricultural population. They are the true cultivators of the soil whether they own the land or work on it as tenants or laborers. A large number farm entirely for subsistence. Even where there are large community pasture lands, the farms are usually small, frequently too small to give an economic return. Consequently incomes are generally low and many landowners, tenants and sharecroppers are constantly indebted to moneylenders. Although illiteracy among the villagers is on the decrease, education remains at a low standard.

The village people produce most of the crops, raise part of the livestock and supply the country with the bulk of its food and raw materials. Their agricultural activity as a rule is dominated by manual and draft animal